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Abstract  
A principal incentive behind the move to digital television has been the release of 
radio spectrum in the attractive UHF band which can be used for other, notably 
wireless, services. This so-called digital dividend and related spectrum battles have 
heightened in recent years as evidenced by the negotiations in the World 
Radiocommunication Conferences. Frequencies are a core input to many industries 
and thus radio spectrum management has acquired high economic and political 
significance. Historically in Europe, the terrestrial platform has been critical for the 
delivery of PSB. But increasingly since 2007, digital terrestrial network operators 
have come under enormous pressure to relinquish frequencies in response to the 
looming spectrum crunch of the wireless broadband sector and the projected 
phenomenal demand for its services. The article argues that limiting spectrum access 
for the DTT platform should not be synonymous with a corresponding weakening of 
PSB. The often dry and technical debate on radio spectrum management cannot 
obscure what is really at stake. The values that PSB stands for need to be adapted to 
and guaranteed in a likely post-broadcast [p. 348] environment. The political, 
economic, social and cultural principles of PSB remain valid irrespective of the 
underlying delivery platform used. The debate on a platform-neutral PSB is currently 
not as prominent as the debate on the spectrum demands of the wireless broadband 
industry. At best, the two debates (future of DTT/ WBB spectrum and future of PSB) 
are conducted in silos. Radio spectrum management should not be used as an(other) 
excuse to weaken PSB. Debate and action based on a digital commons space and 
communication rights can provide the way forward.  
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A principal incentive behind the introduction of digital terrestrial television has been 
the release of radio spectrum in the attractive UHF band1 and its subsequent use for 
other, notably wireless, services. This so-called digital dividend and related spectrum 
battles have heightened in recent years as evidenced by the negotiations in the World 
Radiocommunication Conferences. Radio frequencies are a core input to many, in 
what interests us, communication services and thus radio spectrum management has 
acquired high economic and political significance. Historically in Europe as a whole, 
the terrestrial platform has been critical for the delivery of Public Service 
Broadcasting (PSB). However, increasingly since 2007, digital terrestrial network 
operators have come under enormous pressure to relinquish more frequencies in 
response to the looming spectrum crunch of the wireless broadband (WBB) sector in 
the face of the projected phenomenal demand for its services.  
The article explains that, given its centrality to the delivery of PSB in many 
countries in Europe, the discussion about the future of Digital Terrestrial Television 
(DTT) becomes in essence a discussion about the future of PSB. It argues that a 
weakening of the DTT platform by limiting spectrum access should not be 
synonymous with a corresponding weakening of PSB. The often dry and technical 
debate on radio spectrum management cannot obscure what is really at stake: how to 
adapt and secure PSB values in the emerging media environment, irrespective of 
which transmission platform(s) will succeed. The assumption is that the political, 
economic, social and cultural principles of PSB remain valid regardless of the 
underlying delivery mechanism. The debate on a platform-neutral PSB is currently 
not as prominent as the debate on the spectrum demands of the WBB industry. At 
best, the two debates (future of DTT/ WBB spectrum and future of PSB) are 
conducted in silos. The division of competences within the EU whereby the EU holds 
responsibility for infrastructure and economic issues whilst the member states retain 
responsibility for cultural matters does not help (Michalis 2007). Equally, variations 
in DTT penetration and its importance for the delivery of PSB as well as variations in 
the strength of PSB institutions within the EU are not conducive to a comprehensive 
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debate. Still, it is argued here that radio spectrum management should not be used as 
an(other) excuse to weaken PSB.  
In what follows, the article first discusses radio spectrum management and 
explains its rising economic and political significance. The next section assesses the 
spectrum crunch narrative put forward by the WBB industry to justify its demands for 
more spectrum, and discusses developments and divisions in related international 
negotiations as well as their impact on actual national policies through the 
reassignment of spectrum from DTT to the WBB sector. [p. 349] Next, the article 
examines the main questions raised by the legacy spectrum users over the spectrum 
crunch claims of the WBB industry. There follows a discussion about the possible 
future of PSB centred on platform-neutral values, a digital commons space and 
communication rights. The article ends with a summary of the key arguments.  
 
Radio Spectrum Management:  the limits to market-based thinking and the need 
for regulatory intervention in the DTT/WBB battle 
Radio spectrum appears to be a technical and dry policy area, even if critical to a wide 
range of media and communication services (e.g. public service, commercial, 
terrestrial and satellite television; radio; cellular mobile; wireless internet) but also 
other activities (defence, medical, scientific etc.). The radio spectrum is part of the 
electromagnetic spectrum. It is a natural but finite resource. The useable frequency 
range is between 3 Hz and 3,000 GHz (Laflin and Dajka 2007). Not all frequencies 
have the same characteristics which means that not all are suitable for a particular 
activity. For instance, the higher the frequency, the larger its bandwidth capacity (the 
more information it can carry) but the shorter its range and the distance it travels.  
Frequencies do not stop at national borders and are susceptible to interference. 
For this basic reason radio spectrum has required regulation, nationally and 
internationally. Internationally, the International Telecommunication Union allocates 
frequencies to specific uses (e.g. satellite and terrestrial television, wireless 
broadband) and, for spectrum management purposes, it has divided the world into 
three geographical regions. Region 1, of interest to this article, comprises Europe, 
Africa and the Middle East. Region 2 is the Americas whilst, lastly, Region 3 
comprises the rest of the world, Asia and Australasia. Then nationally, based on these 
international decisions, governments and regulators proceed with the assignment of 
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frequencies to specific users (e.g., television broadcasters, cellular mobile 
companies).  
In the past, during the monopolistic media and communication orders, radio 
spectrum management was straightforward in the sense that governments had to 
satisfy three main users, typically all under state control: public/state broadcasters, 
telephone administrations and the military. These would get frequencies against no or 
a very small fee and the assumption was that they could keep them for life. Under the 
traditional command-and-control approach, governments would decide who could use 
the spectrum and how.  
Since the late 1950s, radio spectrum management has steadily and growingly 
attracted the attention of economists emphasising its untapped economic potential. It 
all famously started with British born economist Ronald Coase who in 1959, studying 
the the Federal Communications Commission in the USA, argued that the aim of 
policy should not be to deal with market failure but rather to define property rights in 
relation to radio spectrum and other natural resources (Coase 1959). His 
unconventional ideas took three decades to be put in practice. Three factors pointing 
to the unattainability of the old consensus were crucial. Firstly, the gradual opening 
up of media and communication markets has resulted in more users needing spectrum 
(for instance, more broadcasters) whilst similarly, secondly, the advent of new 
technologies (notably cellular mobile and more recently broadband wireless) has 
further increased demand. The significant larger number of activities requiring 
spectrum and the concomitant increase of potential users have rendered spectrum [p. 
350] management both more challenging and complicated. Lastly, the traditional 
‘government knows best’ assignment method was criticised for being slow, 
bureaucratic, non-transparent and, to make matters worse, as providing no incentives 
for efficiency or technical innovation with regard to spectrum use. The response to 
these developments and shortcomings has been the growing introduction of less 
prescriptive market-based spectrum management methods, principally auctions, 
whereby the key decisions (who is going to get the frequencies and what their use will 
be) rests no longer with governments but with the market players themselves. The 
marketization of spectrum has the added advantage of raising precious revenue for 
cash-strapped governments.2 Indeed, the auctions for mobile phone licences in the 
USA in the mid-1990s and some of the first 3G auctions in Europe in 2000 at the 
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height of the Internet bubble raised spectacular sums of money for governments 
thereby providing proof that the new economic thinking was working.3 
However, as Sims et al. argue, the belief in the market as the best mechanism 
to manage spectrum was fundamentally shaken in the second half of 2000s in the face 
of the exponential growth of the WBB industry and the associated huge spectrum 
requirements, notably in bands already occupied by digital terrestrial broadcasters. In 
their words: ‘[i]t was a tacit admission either that liberalisation alone could not 
deliver, or that it was inherently a slow process, unfit for its biggest challenge so far.’ 
(Sims et al. 2016: 6). It was clear that the competing demands on spectrum between 
the WBB industry and the incumbent DTT operators were not going to be settled by 
the market but required regulatory intervention and thus an at least partial return to 
the traditional radio spectrum management method. 
In sum, within a short period of time, spectrum management has acquired high 
political and economic significance. In policy terms, as the case of DTT – WBB 
demonstrates, we are at a crossroads as the limits to spectrum liberalisation have 
become obvious and governments have taken it upon themselves to find a solution. It 
is maintained here that this recourse to the traditional spectrum management method 
where governments decide has the potential to facilitate the debate on the future of 
PSB as opposed to the scenario where the decisions would be left solely to the 
market, a scenario that arguably entailed a higher threat to public service policy goals.  
 
From Spectrum Scarcity in Broadcasting to Spectrum Crunch in Mobile: 
(inter)national developments 
Radio spectrum has always been central to broadcasting. In the early days, radio 
spectrum scarcity justified monopolies in television markets (Humphreys 1996). 
Technological advances, market liberalisation and neoliberal ideas stressing the value 
of spectrum as an economic resource have all contributed to end the initial era of 
spectrum scarcity in broadcasting.  
Technological developments (notably the advent of cellular mobile, digital 
television and wireless broadband) and the large number of market players following 
the liberalisation of electronic communications markets have increased demand for 
spectrum, in particular for the most favourable frequencies which are all, however, 
already occupied. The most sought after frequencies, so-called “sweet spot”, are the 
upper part of the Very High Frequency (VHF) band and the entire UHF band (Laflin 
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and Dajka 2007: 8). Various industries make competing claims upon them and 
spectrum management decisions have high economic and political stakes since they 
can open or close market opportunities.  
[p. 351] In recent years, one of the most contentious radio spectrum debates in 
the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) Region 1 (Europe, Africa and the 
Middle East) has concerned the future of the UHF band and in particular the 
allocation of frequencies between the WBB industry which asks for more spectrum 
and the digital terrestrial broadcasters who, in Europe, occupy most of the band. The 
popularisation of smartphones and subsequently other Internet-enabled mobile 
devices (e.g. tablets) has fed into projections that demand for wireless data (notably 
video which requires a lot of bandwidth) stands to skyrocket and that, consequently, 
the industry is in dire need for substantially more spectrum. The belief that the WBB 
sector can advance economic growth and improve competitiveness, significantly more 
than broadcasting services (for Britain see Harvey and Ala-Fossi 2016: 8-9), makes 
the WBB spectrum demands hard to refute, especially given the recession ensuing the 
2008 financial crisis. However, the terrestrial platform is historically associated in 
Europe with PSB. The debate therefore becomes more complicated as the future of 
the UHF band is inextricably linked to the future of PSB, as we shall see. 
There are three main ways to address increasing demand for spectrum: change 
of use, spectrum expansion and substitutes. Change of use, for instance freeing up 
frequencies from broadcasting and reallocating them for use by WBB services, is 
possible but is an expensive and time-consuming process that requires careful 
planning. Another solution to accommodate growing demand for frequencies is to 
expand spectrum either extensively by using higher frequencies (some debates around 
5G) or intensively by squeezing more capacity out of a smaller number of frequencies 
(e.g. the move from analogue to digital television). Finally, a third solution is to use 
substitutes and, for example, rely on wired distribution thereby releasing the 
previously occupied frequencies for another purpose. Switching off terrestrial 
television completely in favour of satellite, cable and IP distribution of television 
signals would be a case in point here.  
The quest for more frequencies to accommodate the projected exponential 
growth of WBB has relied on all three solutions. In policy terms, these solutions 
require international and national decisions. The international policy level has been 
crucial in the WBB spectrum crunch debate. The ITU can identify and allocate more 
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spectrum to specific services/ industries by revising its intergovernmental treaty (the 
Radio Regulations) at its World Radiocommunication Conference (WRC) which 
takes place every three to four years.  
In 2006, in preparation for the WRC-2007, the ITU estimated that between 
1280 and 1720 MHz of spectrum was needed to be allocated to the WBB sector by 
2020 for 3G and 4G mobile communications, a target which the respective industry 
standing to benefit applauded enthusiastically (Decision 2012, para. 22). The WRC-
2007 dealt with the so-called first digital dividend, that is the spectrum that could be 
released following the completion of the switchover from analogue to digital 
terrestrial TV given that the latter requires less spectrum. The freeing up of 
frequencies, especially in the valuable UHF band, could contribute towards satisfying 
the increasing demand for spectrum by the fast-expanding wireless industry. 
However, given differing national circumstances, the WRC-2007 could not agree on 
the same band for all its three Regions. Thus, whereas for Region 2 (Americas) and 
Region 3 (Asia-Pacific) the first digital dividend would be on the 700 MHz band, in 
Region 1 (Europe, Africa and the Middle East) the first digital dividend would be on 
the 800MHz band (Delaere and Cullell-March 2014). This lack of harmonisation 
across the Regions reflected the heavy reliance on the UHF band for the delivery of 
terrestrial television in several European countries.  
[p. 352] But there were divisions within Region 1, reflecting existing 
investment and penetration rates of DTT and WBB. Overall, Africa and the Middle 
East enjoyed more freedom in relation to UHF decisions and at the same time they 
had greater need to assign (more) spectrum to WBB to facilitate access to the Internet 
through wireless devices and thus be able to reap associated economic and social 
benefits. Ironically, having trailed behind Europe in the roll-out of terrestrial analogue 
television and the subsequent switching process from analogue to digital TV meant 
that they were not held back by the legacy of earlier policy decisions and 
infrastructure investments. Africa and the Middle East could turn their perceived 
earlier ‘technological lagging behind’ manifested in the low availability and 
penetration of terrestrial television to their advantage now: they would be able to 
potentially release frequencies to WBB faster and at a fraction of the cost and 
inconvenience experienced in Europe and, equally important, their later move to 
digital terrestrial television meant that they could benefit from subsequent more 
spectral efficient technologies and thus release more spectrum (Stirling 2012).  
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The proposal to repurpose the 700 MHz band for WBB shortly before the 
WRC-2012 at the insistence of African and Middle Eastern countries came as a 
surprise to Europe. These countries (notably the UAE, Egypt and Nigeria) argued 
that: for them, the 700 MHz band would be essentially the first digital dividend, and 
not the second as in Europe, given that the 800-MHz band was used by other services 
such as national defence; the allocation of the 700 MHz band to mobile would 
harmonise its use across all ITU Regions allowing the industry to benefit from 
economies of scale; and lastly, given the favourable propagation characteristics of the 
band, it would contribute to closing the digital divide (El-Moghazi et al. 2014: 6). 
In the end, the WRC-2012 decided that the second portion of the UHF band, 
the 700 MHz band, should be shared by both broadcasting and mobile services (co-
primary status) in Region 1 as of 2015. In contrast, in the rest of the world, the 700 
MHz band was to be assigned exclusively to wireless broadband.  
Meanwhile, Europe was still dealing with the first dividend. In its first radio 
spectrum policy programme adopted in 2012, the EU required all its members to 
reallocate the 800 MHz to WBB services by 2013 and set the target of 1200 MHz of 
spectrum for WBB by 2015 (Decision 2012). This reallocation took more time than 
originally anticipated. The WRC-2007 allocated the 800 MHz band on a co-primary 
basis to broadcasting and mobile broadband, providing flexibility to individual 
countries to use the band for either activity. This resulted in variations and delays 
within the EU as some countries decided to assign the 800 MHz band for non-mobile 
uses, including digital television, whilst other countries, starting with Germany where 
traditionally the terrestrial platform has not been significant for the transmission of 
television, opted to auction the spectrum and allow its use for 4G.  
 Furthermore in 2013, in response to the WRC-2012 decision concerning the 
700 MHz band, Commission Vice-President Neelie Kroes asked Paschal Lamy 
(former EU Trade Commissioner and WTO Director General) to chair a High Level 
group bringing together representatives from the broadcasting, media and mobile 
sectors tasked with finding an agreed position on the future use of the UHF band. It 
was not possible for the Group to reach consensus and the report presented to the 
Commission contained effectively the personal views of Lamy based on the 
discussions of the Group. Lamy recommended the so-called 20-30-25 formula, 
namely the 700 MHz should be repurposed [p. 353] by 2020 (give or take 2 years), 
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that the DTT platform should be guaranteed until 2030, and that finally a state-of-play 
review should take place in 2025.  
The subsequent WRC-2015 endorsed the use of the 700 MHz band for 
wireless broadband for Region 1 too, thereby harmonising this band throughout the 
world with significant industry and economic benefits in terms of scale and reduced 
cost of consumer devices (GSMA 2015). It also ruled the exclusive use of the sub-700 
MHz band, the last and only remaining UHF spectrum, for broadcasting in Region 1. 
In response, in February 2016, the European Commission, endorsed the Lamy 
formula and presented a proposal for a common deadline for the repurposing of the 
700 MHz band for mobile services under harmonised technical conditions whilst 
securing the sub-700 MHz band for DTT and thus providing regulatory certainty in 
the markets where DTT has a significant presence but at the same time allowing 
flexibility so that that can also be used for downlink-only wireless broadband 
electronic communications services (from the network to the user’s receiving 
equipment) in order to cater for national variations in DTT reliance (EC, 2016a). In 
addition to the WRC-2015 outcome, the Commission linked its proposal to the Digital 
Single Market strategy and, of course, the growing demand for wireless broadband 
and the estimate that by 2020 mobile internet traffic would have grown eightfold.  
The 700 MHz band is a ‘sweet spot’ for WBB operators because it can 
provide high transmission speeds together with wide coverage servicing rural areas 
and improving coverage indoors in urban areas, and it can also promote investment in 
innovation around 5G and the Internet of Things. Furthermore, satisfying the 
spectrum needs of the WBB industry is seen as crucial in the efforts to make Europe a 
global leader in 5G with all the accompanying economic benefits. Coordinated 
European action played a crucial role in Europe’s leadership in 2G (GSM) in the 
1990s, a position that Europe relinquished in subsequent generations but is now 
hoping to regain in the 5G race. Releasing and repurposing spectrum for WBB early 
is therefore vital. Indeed, France and Germany have already assigned the 700 MHz 
band to WBB whilst at least four other (Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Britain) will 
complete the process in the next few years. Divergent national approaches are already 
visible even though the Commission explains that common action is needed. 
Similar to the repurposing of the 800 MHz band, the cost of clearing the 700 
MHz band will fall onto terrestrial television network operators, terrestrial 
broadcasters and viewers. In particular the latter would incur costs yet again as they 
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would need to upgrade their reception equipment in advance of the normal equipment 
renewal cycle all in the name of spectrum efficiency without any benefits this time. In 
fact, in some cases, the services available following the squeeze of the DTT platform 
to the sub-700 MHz band will diminish as this band will not be always able to support 
all current services as will be the case in Italy and Spain, two countries that witnessed 
the launch of many new mostly local channels with the introduction of digital 
television. Still, the economic rationale behind the repurpose of the 700 MHz appears 
extremely strong (data from EC 2016b). Against a total cost of €1.3 to 4.5 billion, the 
Commission, based on the proceedings from previous spectrum auctions, expects the 
repurposing of the 700 MHz band to generate around €11 billion. The Commission’s 
data thus suggest that the costs associated with the clearance of the 700 MHz band 
from its current DTT use dwarf the overall revenues by €9.7 to 6.5 billion, an 
extremely enticing incentive in the current austerity times.  
 
[p. 354] Questioning the Spectrum Crisis 
The WBB industry has identified various bands that could be reassigned to it. 
Understandably, the incumbent spectrum users which include terrestrial broadcasters, 
governments, and satellite operators dispute the projected substantial spectrum 
demands put forward (Womersley 2015: 20). Although nobody doubts the increase in 
demand for mobile broadband capacity, what is questioned is the accuracy of the 
traffic projections and associated spectrum requirements by the WBB industry (does 
the WBB industry really need so much more spectrum?).   
Some commentators question the very concept of spectrum crisis. For 
instance, in her book on the US telecommunications and internet markets, Crawford is 
critical of the “spectrum crisis” argument, forcibly pushed by wireless operators. She 
documents how, by 2011, the two main wireless operators AT&T and Verizon had 
succeeded in “[framing] both the policy problem (more spectrum capacity!) and its 
solution (take spectrum away from the broadcasters and give it to broadband!)” 
(Crawford 2013: 243). In refuting the “spectrum crisis” argument, Crawford maintains 
that the two US companies possessed plenty of spectrum already and what was 
needed was investment in additional towers and wires (connecting towers to fibre) in 
order to improve wireless transmission. But, she explains, such capital expenditure 
would reduce the companies’ return on capital and investors do not like that. 
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Beutler goes as far as to suggest that the demands for more spectrum by the 
WBB industry have less to do with mobile traffic projections and rather they are more 
an excuse to limit competition:  
‘the major incentive to get hold of the entire UHF band is not shortage of 
spectrum but rather the attempt of mobile network operators to get rid of a 
powerful competitor (ie. the broadcasters) in their effort to gain ground in the 
hard-fought market segment of audiovisual content provision.’ (2015: 26) 
Looking more closely at the traffic projections, at least five factors raise 
reasonable doubts about the spectrum needs of the WBB industry. The first has to do 
with the very wide estimates of the growth of mobile data. Studies, most of them 
backed by the WBB industry, push some to question the validity of the projections. 
Interestingly, Cisco, which has been publishing annually an influential study on traffic 
projections and growth trends for a decade, has revised its traffic growth forecasts 
downwards twice now (see VNI 2014 for downward revisions in the 2013 report and 
similarly the 2013 for revisions in the 2012 report). Mehta and Mussey (2015: 315) 
assessed the reliability of mobile demand projections and concluded that in the past 
seven Cisco forecasts ‘overestimates were nearly twice as frequent as underestimates 
(19 vs. 10)’ whilst, moreover, overestimates were ‘on average of greater magnitude 
than underestimates (103 vs. 81 [petabytes]/month).’ They found that industry 
forecasts produced the highest mobile traffic growth projections, not surprisingly 
since network providers or equipment manufacturers, such as Cisco, stand to benefit 
directly from such high projections. They noted that independent research firms with 
‘a less direct relationship to the benefits of additional spectrum allocation’ to 
broadband wireless produced lower projections but noted that such firms may still 
have ‘institutional relationships and biases that potentially hinder complete 
objectivity’ (p. 318). And yet, the [p. 355] various industry and research projections 
are endorsed without verification by national and international regulatory bodies (e.g. 
FCC in the USA and the ITU) which then base policy decisions on the allocation of 
spectrum resources on them.  
The second factor has to do with current consumption patterns. Not only is 
there no consensus about how much data will travel on mobile networks but, if 
current practices are any indication for the future, despite the increasing penetration of 
Internet-enabled mobile devices and additional spectrum granted to the mobile 
industry most of the data will not travel through cellular mobile networks but continue 
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to be offloaded onto Wi-Fi networks.4 As mobile users ‘are increasingly using Wi-Fi 
connections for calls and texts as well as data … they have ever less need for a mobile 
connection, no matter how blazingly fast it may be.’ (Anon. 2016). Indeed, according 
to Cisco’s latest annual publication on traffic projections, Wi-Fi offloading has been 
growing over the years, despite continuing investment in faster mobile networks and 
increased coverage. Cisco notes that in 2015 for the first time more than half of 
mobile data traffic was offloaded onto the fixed network through Wi-Fi and this trend 
shows no signs of slowing down (Cisco 2016: 1). Cisco (2016: 21) expects offloading 
to increase to 55% in 2020. Paradoxically, Cisco observes that ‘Wi-Fi offload is 
higher on [faster] 4G networks than on lower-speed networks’ and it expects that it 
will rise from 56% at the end of 2015 to 58% by 2020. In short, faster mobile 
networks have not diminished the rising offloading trend and will not render fixed 
networks obsolete. Instead of platform convergence where mobile and IP will take 
over, what we see is platform co-existence and complementarity. Lamy (2014: 4) was 
right to note that the broadcast-broadband convergence is not going to materialize ‘for 
a long time.’  
The third factor that questions the spectrum needs of the WBB sector is the 
growing interest in wholesale networks. This refers to mobile operators sharing 
infrastructure, a practice that is more commonplace with newer generations of mobile 
technology. Network sharing makes economic and environmental sense but it means 
at the same time fewer separate networks and in turn less pressure on spectrum. 
Indeed, Cave and Webb (2015) as well as Sims et al. (2016 Part IV) identify a policy 
shift towards spectrum sharing, not least in response to the shortcomings of the  
market-based assignment mechanisms (principally auctions and trading).  
The fourth and related factor is the trend towards market consolidation. In 
recent years, the number of mobile operators in Europe has decreased as a result of 
mergers in various countries, including Ireland, Germany and Austria. In January 
2016 in Britain, the regulators approved the £12.5bn merger between the largest fixed 
operator BT with the largest mobile operator EE thus allowing the former to enter the 
mobile market and provide quad-offers (CMA, 2016). The increased consolidation in 
the European mobile markets and the concomitant reduction in the number of 
operators arguably reduce demands on spectrum by the WBB industry without 
sacrificing its growth.  
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Finally, the mobile industry in Europe acquired significant parts of the radio 
spectrum in anticipation of its investment in 3G and 4G. It is unclear how much of the 
already allocated spectrum the industry is using and as such what the incremental 
benefits of releasing yet more spectrum to the WBB industry would be (Ratkaj 2013): 
what could the industry deliver with the additional spectrum it asks for that cannot be 
delivered on the significant amounts of spectrum already granted and that will be so 
extraordinary so as to justify the disruption and threat to the economic, social and 
cultural [p. 356] benefits of DTT that such a reassignment of frequencies entails? 
Furthermore, despite the uncertainties surrounding the next generation of mobile 
technology (5G), it appears that spectrum outside the UHF band (for instance, above 3 
GHz) could be useful and, more importantly, could be provided with considerably 
less disruption and without threatening the benefits the DTT generates (Anon. 2016).  
 
The value of DTT in Europe and the future of PSB: digital commons, 
communication rights and the importance of distribution  
The breakthrough in digital compression technology in 1990 in the USA, ushered in 
the race for fully digital television. The transition to digital television has been 
country specific shaped by national characteristics as well as policy and infrastructure 
legacies (Starks 2013). DTT has been the most controversial and lengthy platform 
transition, strongly linked to the future of PSB. The migration process has been costly 
for terrestrial broadcast network operators, broadcasters and consumers. Besides the 
benefits of digital television (more channels, new formats notably high definition and 
interactive television, and higher quality sound and picture), one core incentive 
behind the push for DTT has been the spectrum efficiencies it can deliver and the 
consequent release of frequencies to be reallocated for use by WBB services believed 
to contribute to greater economic growth, frequencies which can be auctioned and 
raise revenue for governments (Galperin 2004).  
In Europe, the UHF band has been reserved historically for terrestrial 
television and is critical for the delivery of DTT. In fact, in contrast to the WBB 
sector that can rely on non-UHF frequencies (for instance, on higher bands) to support 
their services, the UHF band is the only band that is suitable for broadcasting.  
Despite differing penetration rates, the DTT platform is considered important 
in most European countries. Almost half of all households (250 million people) rely 
on DTT whilst the EBU (2014a) estimates that live TV viewing will continue to be 
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important and still account for over 80% of TV consumption in 2020. In some 
Southern European countries (such as Greece, Italy and Spain), the DTT platform is 
dominant. Even in countries where the DTT platform has been facing strong 
competition from cable, satellite and IPTV (like France and Britain), DTT remains the 
only platform that offers universality. In Britain, for example, according to the latest 
available data, in 2014, 41% of households received television via DTT only whilst 
DTT was the dominant tv viewing platform at just under 45% compared to the second 
higher, the satellite platform with a 40.5% share, a percentage that has not increased 
since 2010 (Ofcom 2016: para. 3:10). This indicates that television consumption 
platforms and patterns are more resilient than market forecasts would lead us believe.  
The DTT platform is often the pillar of PSB delivery and key in supporting 
crucial public policy goals (for instance, Ofcom 2014). It offers innovation and 
competition to other (typically subscription-based) television platforms. Moreover, as 
a key platform for many major broadcasters, DTT supports considerable investment 
in original content and thus promotes European cultural diversity. The DTT platform 
is a cost effective and reliable means of delivery that offers unparalleled reach and 
original quality programming (including news), all important in encouraging active 
citizenship and enhancing common experiences and social cohesion. With no 
gatekeepers and no encryption, it is the only platform in most European countries that 
can deliver [p. 357] these substantial economic, political, cultural and social benefits 
to citizens free at the point of access. Another important advantage of the terrestrial 
platform is that it is national and hence allows governments to retain strong regulatory 
powers over broadcasting services as opposed, for instance, to satellite and IP 
distribution which can be based and controlled from outside a country’s borders. 
These core benefits are closely interdependent so that a change in one (for example, 
weakening the DTT platform) will impact upon others (associated economic, 
political, cultural and social benefits). 
At the moment, there is no other platform in sight that can credibly support 
broadcasting and has the same reach as DTT.5 Mobile broadcast and IP technologies 
cannot, at least in the foreseeable future, meet the same levels of quality, universality 
and cost-effectiveness that the DTT in the UHF band offers (EBU 2014b, Goggin 
2012, Plum Consulting and Farncombe 2014). Besides technical questions, various 
operational and policy issues remain unresolved. For instance, data caps in pricing 
schemes would not allow the consumption of television content (unless it is offloaded 
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on WiFi networks as is currently the practice) or would make such consumption 
prohibitively expensive; the extent to which mobile broadcast technologies can 
support simultaneous viewing is unclear; and consumer devices that can support 
mobile broadcast are not widespread (EBU 2014c: 45). 
It is not just that the new distribution platforms (cable, satellite, IP, mobile) 
have intermediaries and, unlike terrestrial broadcasting, carry the risk of rent-seeking 
gatekeepers, it is also the case that the new distribution platforms are typically 
commercial and interested in creating and exploiting artificial scarcities for financial 
benefit. As Martin explains, the digital ubiquity newer technological platforms, like 
mobile and IP, promise on the one hand offers the potential of expanding the reach of 
PSB and enabling participation but on the other hand it entails greater reliance on 
corporate players, ‘private control over public resources and communications,’ deeper 
surveillance of citizens/ users, and ultimately the further entanglement of PSB in the 
agendas of a few transnational technological giants and the structures of informational 
capitalism (2016: 7, 16). Multiplatform presence involves significant distribution 
costs whilst it seems that there will continue to be a need for regulatory intervention 
that will ensure the presence, easy findability and affordability of public service 
content. This brings us to the concept of a commons.  
The weakening of the DTT platform can become a symptom and a cause of 
the broader trend of reducing the public sector and of the intensifying enclosure of the 
(digital) commons (Murdock 2005). For Murdock, PSB can be the pivot of digital 
commons space, ‘a linked space defined by its shared refusal of commercial enclosure 
and its commitment to free and universal access, reciprocity, and collaborative 
activity’ (2005, p. 227). Moe (2011) finds Murdock’s idea of a commons space 
valuable for guiding communication policy in conceptualising public service beyond 
broadcasting even though this space could encompass services and content from a 
variety of other actors too, including libraries, museums and civil society. 
The above discussion illustrates the key argument of this article. The starting 
point is that distribution and content are interrelated. Distribution – how we find and 
get content – matters as much as the content we access (Michalis 2014). What is at 
stake at present is not the future of a distribution platform as such but rather what this 
platform stands for. The weakening of the terrestrial television platform by limiting its 
access to frequencies entails serious implications for innovation and competition in 
the field of distribution but also, [p. 358] crucially, for the terms of access to public 
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service content and very likely for public content creation too. What is at stake is the 
future of PSB, its values which are preconditions for the delivery of core public policy 
objectives in a democratic society: public content free at the point of consumption, 
independence, universality of access and appeal, quality content, all facilitating social 
inclusion and political participation in society (BRU 1985). The case for PSB remains 
valid and powerful (e.g. Brevini 2013). A recent report on the future for public service 
television in Britain underlines the continuing relevance of these values of 
‘independence, universality, citizenship, quality and diversity’ and argues that these 
need to be embedded into the regulation, funding, and I would add distribution, of 
PSB in the changing media landscape (Future of TV 2016, 155). Interestingly, the 
BBC Strategy Paper in October 2015 defines PSB referring to ‘[a]ccess to culture, 
media and information’ as ‘a basic human right’ (BBC 2015: 9). In other words, the 
justification for the BBC/ PSB is no longer about public value but it is about 
fundamental rights; PSB is an entitlement.  
A DTT switch-off is unlikely until at least 2030. The challenge till then is to 
try to replicate, and even enhance, the existing strong economic, social, political and 
cultural benefits currently associated with the DTT platform, discussed above, to the 
evolving digital media environment.  Murdock’s idea of a digital commons space and 
the (re)emergence of a rights-based discourse6 provide useful directions for policy 
debate and action. A citizens-centred digital commons, as opposed to a commercially 
enclosed one, can promote communication rights facets of which include access to 
information, equal distribution of commutative resources and power, the promotion of 
trust and understanding in contemporary societies. Both notions (digital commons – 
communication rights) emphasise the central role of PSB organisations but at the 
same time acknowledge the contribution other actors can make, including museums, 
galleries but also local communities. In addition, both concepts allow us to go beyond 
a simple reconceptualisation of PSB in the post-broadcast multi-platform environment 
to address contemporary policy issues such as persistent restrictive structural 
characteristics of the media market, notably concentration of ownership, and newer 
concerns such as the emergence of new gatekeepers in the delivery of public service 
content (e.g. powerful platforms). This last point draws attention to the need to 
include the distribution of content (how we find it and how it is delivered) to the 




This article started with a discussion of the intensifying pressures in Europe to release 
more UHF spectrum from DTT in order to accommodate the expected phenomenal 
growth of the WBB sector. This so-called digital dividend debate has heightened in 
recent years as evidenced by the negotiations in the World Radiocommunication 
Conferences, especially from 2007 onwards. These developments manifest the critical 
economic and political significance of the radio spectrum. The article moved on to 
critically assess the spectrum crunch narrative put forward by the WBB industry to 
justify its demands for more spectrum and looked into the arguments put forward by 
legacy users and other commentators.  
 It has been argued that the seemingly technical and dry area of radio spectrum 
management should not obscure the vital economic, social, political and cultural and 
issues that are at stake and are supported by PSB. The DTT platform [p. 359] in 
Europe is often the pillar of PSB delivery and associated public policy goals. The 
future of a single platform (DTT) should not be aligned with the future of PSB values 
so that the weakening of one automatically signals the weakening of the other. Rather 
the debate on the future of the DTT platform can be turned into an opportunity and 
used to strengthen calls for a technology-neutral definition of PSB and its continuing, 
if not reinforced, significance in the emerging multiplatform environment. The article 
discussed some serious doubts about the all IP future scenario and its feasibility but 
even if we agree that the future lies with IP networks, the key question remains: how 
can we replicate and even strengthen the existing economic, political, social and 
cultural benefits that we have at present in the DTT world? Policy debate and action 
based on a non-commercial citizenship-focused digital commons space as a 
precondition for the support of communication rights can provide a way forward. This 
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Endnotes: 																																																								1	Ultra-High Frequency (UHF) band (470-790 MHz).	
2 Not all spectrum auctions have been successful in financial terms.  3	In Britain, in 2000, the Treasury raised €39bn (£22.5bn) whilst the proceeds from the German 3G 
auctions later that year were €50.5bn (£30.3 bn).	4	The Wi-Fi industry uses unlicensed spectrum primarily in the 2.4 GHz band. 
5 There are exceptions like Belgium and the Netherlands which historically have had an extensive cable 
infrastructure.  6	For an historical and geographical overview see Padovani and Calabrese 2014. For a recent account 
see Aslama Horowitz and Nieminen 2016.	
